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Abstract 
Though the recent literature offers intuitively appealing bases for, and 
evidence of, a linkage among religious beliefs, religious participation and 
economic outcomes, evidence on a relationship between religion and trust is 
mixed. By allowing for an attendance effect, disaggregating Protestant 
denominations, and using a more extensive data set, probit models of the 
General Social Survey (GSS), 1975 through 2000, show that black 
Protestants, Pentecostals, fundamentalist Protestants, and Catholics, trust 
others less than individuals who do not claim a preference for a particular 
denomination. For conservative denominations the effect of religion is through 
affiliation, not attendance. In contrast, liberal Protestants trust others more 
and this effect is reinforced by attendance. The impact of religion on 
moderate Protestants is only through attendance, as frequency of attendance 
increases trust of others while the denomination effect is insignificant. 
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Introduction 
Until recently, economists have tended to either minimize or 
ignore altogether the potential impact of cultural factors on economic 
efficiency and performance. Within the past few years, however, there 
has been a renewed interest among economists regarding social trust 
and religion and their effect on individual attitudes and economic 
outcomes. Guiso et al., (2003) discuss the problem of causality 
possibility working in both directions in studies of cultural factors and 
economic outcomes. Their claim is that religion practices evolve only 
over very long time horizons and therefore can be treated as time 
invariant over an individual's lifetime. In cross-country studies (Guiso 
et al. 2003, 2006), they then postulate a link between culture, in 
which they include religious groups, and economic outcomes. Their 
hypothesis is that culture impacts economic preferences (such as labor 
market participation, trust, thriftiness, and fertility) and, in turn, 
economic outcomes. Likewise Barro and McCleary (2003, 2006) invoke 
Weber's argument that religious beliefs matter for important economic 
behavior such as honesty and trust in affecting economic performance. 
In a similar manner, Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) focus on 
international economic policy issues and argue that religious affiliation 
has an important impact on an individual's view of others and 
therefore impacts attitudes toward trade and immigration policy, while 
Torgler (2006a) finds that religiosity correlates positively with tax 
compliance and (2006b) positively with trust in international 
organizations such as the United Nations. The common theme is that 
religious beliefs shape attitudes (such as trust) which, in turn, impact 
economic performance. 
 
Although these authors make an intuitively appealing basis for a 
linkage between religious beliefs, participation, and economic 
outcomes, a significant relationship between religion and trust is mixed 
at best. In another cross-country study, Smidt (1999) finds not only a 
statistically significant lower level of social trust in the United States 
than in Canada (based on means comparison), but also a positive 
correlation between trust and church attendance even while controlling 
for denomination. Additionally, he finds that, again based on a 
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comparison of mean values, black Protestants and Evangelical 
Protestants in the United States are generally less trusting than other 
denominations while mainline are Protestants more trusting. 
There are few studies, however, on what exactly might add to or 
reduce social trust. Putnam's (2000) sweeping survey of the American 
social landscape is one important exception. Putnam's hypothesis is 
that there has been a decline in social trust over time because of 
waning voluntary participation in civic, social, and religious networks. 
Putnam also observes that it has been the newer evangelical religious 
denominations that have experienced growth and that these 
denominations tend to focus community efforts inward rather than 
outward. He concludes that (p. 79) “trends in religious life reinforce 
rather than counterbalance the ominous plunge in social 
connectedness in the secular community.” Further, as Arrow (2000) 
and Putnam (2000) point out, and Glaeser et al. (1996) demonstrate 
in their study of social interactions and crime, there can be a “dark 
side” to social capital, as social interactions can have negative effects 
as well as positive. For example, social capital may reinforce 
stratification among groups in society. 
Recently, economists and sociologists have been interested in 
the various determinants of social trust. The most recent studies of the 
determinants of social trust in the United States include Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002) and Welch et al. (2004) who specifically investigate the 
role of religion. Alesina and La Ferrara use 20 years of General Social 
Survey (GSS) data, including among other factors, dummy variables 
for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other religions. Regarding the 
religion controls, they find that (p. 220), “interestingly, these variables 
are totally insignificant.” Welch et al. (2004) focus specifically on the 
link between religion and individual trust. They employ a single year 
(2000) of National Election Study (NES) data to examine the link 
between an individual's religious affiliation and attendance and their 
trust. They conclude (p. 336) that “contrary to many social 
commentators and democratic theorists,” conservative Protestant 
beliefs do not reduce social trust (relative to individuals who do not 
claim a religious affiliation) and attendance does not correlate with 
social trust. 
In this paper we also focus on the relationship between religious 
traditions, religious participation, and social trust in the United States. 
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In particular we hypothesize that religious participation generates trust 
of others, and that religious tradition or affiliation impacts an 
individual's trust of others, but that there are differential effects on 
individual trust across denominations. Our claim is that fundamentalist 
denominations are thick-tie networks (along the lines of Granovetter 
(1983)) that generate strong in-group trust (or bonding social capital 
as in Putnam (2000)) at the expense of others outside of the 
fundamentalist enclave. In other words, there is greater trust of those 
within the individual's religious network but lower trust of others in 
society in general. Liberal Protestant denominations, in contrast, are 
weak-tie networks that generate relatively more outward trust (or 
bridging social capital). That is, there is a greater emphasis on the role 
of the individual in society as a whole in these networks and, 
therefore, a greater level of trust of others in society in general than 
that of conservative denominations. Hence, participation and religious 
affiliation may exert reinforcing or offsetting effects on an individual's 
general or overall level of trust. In this application, “social trust” is the 
generalized trust of “others” in society. We are unable and do not test 
interpersonal trust or trust of others within specific networks, an 
extension that also deserves greater attention. 
For comparison purposes, our study is designed to compare and 
contrast with Alesina and La Ferrara and with Welch et al. There are, 
however, some important differences. Contrasting with Alesina and La 
Ferrara, we extend the GSS data from 1994 to 2000, disaggregate 
Protestant into various logical groupings suggested by the literature, 
and include a measure of participation (attendance). We differ from 
Welch et al., by using the GSS data covering several years as opposed 
to a single year centered on a national election and its potential 
anomalies. In addition to the time dimension, the larger sample gives 
us an additional advantage in that our estimates of average effects of 
specific grouping of Protestant denominations are based on much 
larger samples.1 In contrast to both studies, we also investigate the 
time aspect of the data set.  
The General Social Survey (GSS), 1975 through 2000, is used 
to empirically examine the propositions given above. The dependent 
variable of analysis is a standard question on the degree of trust of 
others in general. Based on probit models, our results show that black 
Protestants, Pentecostals, fundamentalist Protestants, and Catholics, 
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trust others less than those individuals who do not claim a preference 
for a particular religious denomination. For these denominations, the 
dominant effect of religion is through affiliation as there is only weak 
evidence of an attendance effect. In contrast, liberal Protestants trust 
others more and this effect is reinforced by attendance. The impact of 
religion on moderate Protestants is through attendance, as frequency 
of attendance increases trust of others while the denomination effect is 
insignificant. A time-trend is significant and negative, confirming the 
observations of Putnam and others that trust has been declining over 
time. The interaction of the time-trend with religious denominations 
and with religious attendance, however, is not significant. Hence, 
although membership in various denominations has changed over 
time, the contribution of various denominations and attendance does 
not appear to have. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second 
section offers a brief narrative of the theories on the determinants of 
social trust and provides hypotheses on how religion likely affects trust 
of others. The third section describes the data and empirical model. 
The fourth section provides and interprets the empirical results, while 
the final section offers a conclusion. 
Social Trust: Why Might Religion Matter? 
Theories on the determinants of social trust typically focus on 
either individual demographics and experiences, or the cultural and 
societal environment in which the individual resides. These two 
approaches are typically referred to as Individual Theory and Societal 
Theory. (See Delhey and Newton (2003) for a concise yet 
comprehensive survey of theories of the determinants of social trust.) 
Individual theories of trust postulate that successful and happy 
individuals are more trusting. In regard to economic success, the 
notion is that individuals in a tenuous economic situation have more to 
lose if their trust in someone else is violated. In other words, trust is a 
much riskier proposition to the poor. The marginal risk of placing trust 
in another to the successful and secure, however, is much lower. This 
view is consistent with Putnam's (2000: 138) observation that in 
virtually all societies the “haves” are more trusting than the “have-
nots.” In addition, those who have been treated better by others tend 
to be more trusting. In general, therefore, individuals with lower levels 
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of education, lower socioeconomic status, minorities, and those who 
have experienced divorce or separation are less likely to trust others. 
According to societal theories, the second broad category of 
trust theories, individuals develop trust attitudes when interacting with 
other individuals in society, and likewise affect other individuals' 
attitudes. There are three non-mutually exclusive theories under the 
umbrella of societal theory. Voluntary Association Theory maintains 
that direct interaction with others on a sustained basis in voluntary 
organizations (such as a religion-based organization) builds social trust 
and, therefore, societies with dense and well-formed formal voluntary 
networks will generate relatively higher levels of social trust. Social 
Networks Theory, in contrast, claims that although direct interaction is 
still important, it is casual and impromptu interactions, such as 
chatting with a neighbor in line at the grocery, with neighbors you 
encounter at the local pub, or ad hoc contacts in informal networks, for 
example at work, that are vital. Another branch of Societal Theory, 
Community Theory, places importance on the characteristics of society 
itself. According to this approach, individuals who live in societies with 
higher levels of income equality and greater ethnic and racial 
homogeneity are more trusting. As Delhey and Newton stress, none of 
these theories are mutually exclusive and their measurement 
indicators often overlap. Empirical models, therefore, at the same time 
may find support for many or all of these theories. 
Relating and Testing the Social Theories of Trust and 
Religion 
Participation in a religion is the predominant form of voluntary 
association in the United States and, therefore, one might expect, a 
priori, that religious participation would be positive and significant in 
empirical models of trust. Otherwise, the voluntary association 
theories would appear suspect. Furthermore, given the diversity of 
religious denominations in the United States, one might also expect 
that the impact of participation in a religious network on individual 
trust would vary across denominations along the lines of Community 
Theory. Herein lies a dilemma for studying the link between religion 
and trust: theoretically there are two channels through which 
participation in a religion may affect trust. On the one hand, voluntary 
association theory would have that the frequency of participation in a 
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religion-based network leads to an increase in trust. Community 
Theory, on the other hand, allows for different approaches to 
practicing one's faith and for those approaches to exert differential 
effects on individual trust. In other words, the religious denomination 
and its various customs, messages, and traditions are an important 
determinant of trust. 
Outcomes of Religious Participation 
According to Wuthnow (2002), religious participation has long 
been considered important as a “social resource,” being a source of 
interpersonal networks and interaction, and has been shown to be an 
important determinant of other types of civic involvement. Smidt 
(1999) claims that religious life serves as an important contributor to 
civil society, and, more specifically, that religious beliefs may shape 
the ways in which individuals view human nature and the extent to 
which members of one religious community relate to those inside and 
outside of the community. 
Along this line of reasoning, Coreno (2002: 337) argues that 
“… fundamentalists often form small interconnected independent 
denominations in the hope of protecting a quarantined traditionalist 
culture inside a network of church-based institutions. They nourish 
these enclave communities by separating themselves as much as 
possible from mainline churches in particular and secular culture in 
general.” (See similar arguments by Ammerman (1998), Marsden 
(1991), and Tamney (1992).) Smith (1986) adds that southern 
fundamentalist denominations, in particular, support a stronger sense 
of this separatism attitude. 
In the same literature, it is argued that moderate and liberal 
Protestants, in contrast, are less threatened by secular society and 
tend to thrive more in a modern world. They are also less concerned 
with biblical inerrancy and tend to treat religious beliefs as more 
personal and private. Further, moderate or mainline denominations 
tend to relate more inclusively with other denominations and engage 
more in ecumenical activities. 
In regard to Catholics, Putnam (1993) argues that the 
hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy hinders 
cooperation and trust. Smidt (1999), however, in a comparison of the 
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United States and Canada, finds that within the United States, 
Catholics tend to be more trusting of others than evangelical 
Protestants and less trusting than mainline Protestants, but Catholics 
ranked significantly lower than members of Protestant denominations 
in terms of civic engagement. Welch et al. (2004), in contrast, argue 
that, at least since Vatican II, there is no reason to expect that 
Catholics would trust any less than mainstream Protestants. They 
claim that the American Catholic Church is substantially different from 
the Church in Italy, and that most US Catholic parishes do not 
maintain a rigid boundary against the outside culture. Based on this 
literature we expect that Catholics would fall somewhere between 
fundamentalist Protestants and moderate Protestants in terms of social 
trust and do not expect a priori any difference between pre-Vatican II 
Catholics and post-Vatican II Catholics. 
Hence, a thorough study of the impact of religion in individual 
trust must allow for: (1) affiliation effects; (2) participation effects; 
and (3) the interaction between affiliation and participation. We argue, 
therefore, that the differing approaches of Pentecostal, fundamentalist, 
moderate, and liberal Protestant denominations will be reflected in 
differing attitudes of trust among Protestant members. More 
specifically, we hypothesize that Pentecostal and fundamentalist 
denominations are thick-tie networks (along the lines of Granovetter 
(1983)) or bonding networks (Putnam 2000) that generate “thick 
trust” or strong in-group trust at the expense of “thin trust,” or trust 
towards “others” outside of the fundamentalist enclave. Liberal 
Protestant denominations, in contrast, are weak-tie or bridging 
networks that generate relatively more outward trust. Hence, 
members of fundamentalist denominations are less likely to trust 
others than the non-affiliated and members of liberal denominations. 
In an empirical study, the foregoing argument implies that 
aggregating Protestant denominations together in a single category 
(as in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)), might result in the differing 
trust attitudes offsetting each other, leading to an incorrect conclusion 
that “religion” is a statistically insignificant determinant of individual 
trust. Yet, when considering sub groupings of individuals, one must 
ensure that the sample size of each subgroup is sufficient to yield a 
reasonable estimate of the “average” attitude of the subgroup. Our 
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use of the GSS data while disaggregating the Protestant family of 
denominations addresses these concerns. 
Data and Model 
The previous sections motivate the following three testable 
hypotheses:  
1. Members of conservative Protestant denominations are less 
likely to trust others, compared with the base group of 
individuals who do not claim a preference for a religious 
denomination. 
2. Religious participation, in general and independent of affiliation, 
leads to greater trust of others. 
3. Based on the claims of Putnam (2000) we should find, in 
addition, a statistically significant decline in trust over time. 
However, we have no expectations regarding whether the 
contribution of the various Protestant denominations and 
participation, in general, has been stable over time or has also 
evolved. 
Data 
Our data source is the General Social Survey (GSS) spanning 
the years 1975 through 2000. It is important to note that, because 
respondents to the GSS are different in each survey, this is pooled 
cross-sectional data, not panel data. Nonetheless, the time aspect of 
the data gives an interesting dimension to examine. That is, is there a 
general decline in trust as suggested by others, and are the 
contributions of various religious denominations and by religious 
attendance (in general) stable over time? Table 1 summarizes all of 
the variables and provides all of the specific years included in the 
empirical model. The dependent variable of the primary regression 
model is the response to the question: “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?” Possible responses are; “most people can be 
trusted,” “can't be too careful,” “depends,” “don't know,” and “no 
answer.” Because of the limited nature of the dependent variable, we 
follow Alesina and La Ferrara and code this as a binary model with 
unity assigned to the first category and zero to the remaining 
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categories except for no-answer responses which are treated as 
missing observations. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Observations Mean/ 
proportion 
 
SD 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Trust 24,615 0.3878 0.4873 0 1 
Age 31,309 45.2438 17.5684 18 89 
Married 31,400 53.95% 0.4984 0 1 
Female 31,408 56.80% 0.4954 0 1 
African American 31,408 13.25% 0.3390 0 1 
Education <12 31,312 24.00% 0.4271 0 1 
Education >16 31,312 9.24% 0.2895 0 1 
Children 31,298 1.9288 1.7881 0 8 
Log Real income 28,354 2.3065 0.0802 1.83 2.43 
Full-time 31,405 50.20% 0.5000 0 1 
Part-time 31,405 10.42% 0.3055 0 1 
Divorced/separated 31,400 15.76% 0.3644 0 1 
Happy 31,113 2.2030 0.6275 1 3 
Attendance1 30,924 22.0776 23.0224 0 60 
Source: General Social Survey, 1975–2000. Total of 31,408 observations. Specific 
years are: 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Nine Census divisions are also included. Go 
to http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf for a map of the regions and 
divisions. 
1Attendance is annualized following Putnam (2000: 424): never=0, less than once a 
year=0.5, once a year=l, several times a year=6, once a month=12, 2–3 times a 
month=30, nearly every week=40, every week=52, more than once a week=60. 
 
lndependent variables include demographic variables reflecting 
individual characteristics such as age and age squared (to allow for a 
non-linear effect of age), the number of children the respondent has, 
dummy variables for married, divorced or separated, female, African 
American, education of 12 years or less and education of 16 years or 
more, part-time employment and full-time employment.2 The log of 
the level of real income is also included as is the individual's response 
to a question on their general level of happiness.3 The happiness 
variable (Happy) is coded as 3 for the response of “very happy,” 2 for 
“pretty happy,” and 1 for “not too happy.”  
The individual's response to the question “what is your religious 
preference?” is included, beginning with the major denominations of 
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Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other religions. The base group, 
therefore, is individuals who did not report a preference for a specific 
denomination. The individual's reported attendance of religious 
services is also included. This variable measures the individual's 
reported frequency of attending religious services and ranges from 
“never” to “several times a week.” Note that individuals who do not 
report a preferred religion may still report that they attend religious 
services (even if only attending at holidays, weddings and baptisms). 
A description of the attendance variable and statistics on the mean 
frequency of attendance across denominations is provided in Table 2. 
Table 2: Denominations and Attendance1  
Denomination Proportion of total  N = 31,408 Mean  attendance SD 
Protestant 60.91% 24.39 23.1727 
Black Protestant 10.86% 28.16 21.9273 
Fundamentalist 23.15% 27.85 24.4467 
Pentecostal 2.59% 34.18 25.1886 
Fundamentalist2 20.55% 27.04 24.2352 
Moderate 13.80% 20.30 22.0654 
Liberal 12.66% 19.21 21.1686 
Catholic 24.70% 25.08 22.9662 
Jewish 1.99% 10.04 16.0325 
Other  religion 2.26% 18.09 22.3982 
No preference 9.87% 3.47 11.4589 
Notes: 1Attendance is annualized following Putnam (2000: 424): never=0, less than 
once a year=0.5, once a year=1, several times a year=6, once a month=12, 2–3 
times a month=30, nearly every week=40, every week=52, more than once a 
week=60. 
2Fundamentalist with Pentecostals removed. 
See Table 1 for summary statistics on the attendance variable. 
Empirical Model 
The data described above represent our base model which we 
first compare with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002). Because of the 
limited nature of the dependent variable, a probit model is employed. 
All specifications of the empirical model include controls for the nine 
Census divisions and the year of the survey. The 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used for robust 
standard errors and the clustering of respondents in metropolitan 
areas is controlled for using the size of the SMA. Listwise deletion is 
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used for missing observations resulting in a different number of usable 
observations for each regression model. Reported coefficients are the 
maximum-likelihood estimates of the marginal effects calculated at the 
mean. Hence, the coefficients reflect the change in the probability 
given an infinitesimal change in the mean value of the independent 
variable. For dummy variables the marginal change is the discrete 
change from zero to unity. All p-values referenced in the text are for 
two-tailed tests unless otherwise noted. 
Results 
Model 1 in Table 3, reports results for the base model, which is 
provided for comparison purposes with the studies referenced earlier. 
The results indicate that trust rises with age, income, education, for 
those who work part-time, and for individuals who describe 
themselves as happy. Age squared indicates that the age effect is 
diminishing with increasing years of age with the maximum effect 
occurring at approximately age 66. In contrast, married individuals 
and individuals who are divorced or separated, females, African 
Americans, and individuals with 12 years or less of education are less 
likely to trust others (relative to their respective base groups). None of 
the religious denominations are individually significant. However, a 
test of the joint significance of the denomination variables, not 
examined in either Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) or Welch et al. 
(2004), yields a chi-square statistic of 9.47 (which is significant at the 
5 percent level), so we may reject the hypothesis of no joint 
significance and the hypothesis of no difference among denominations. 
This motivates further investigation of the individual and joint 
significance of various sub-denominations. 
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Table 3: Model Results 
 
Dependent variable is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” Robust standard errors 
are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed tests. All models include 
year and census division controls and these results are available upon request. 
Attendance and Sub-denominations 
As explained earlier, attendance may, in and of itself, have an 
important effect as the extent of past interaction and expected future 
interaction in community networks may generate bridging trust, even 
if the individual is not committed to a particular tradition. In addition, 
various Protestant denominations or traditions may well have 
differential effects on their members. If either or both of the effects 
are indeed important, then the results in Model 1 suffer from omitted 
variable bias. Attendance is therefore added to Model 1 and the results 
are provided in Model 2 of Table 3. The results show that attendance is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level.4 Including this variable 
also causes: (1) Catholic to become statistically significantly negative 
(p-value of 7 percent) and (2) the chi-square statistic of joint 
significance of the four denominations to rise to 10.22 (p-value of 3.69 
percent).  
The GSS data also includes a variable that sorts Protestant 
denominations in conservative, moderate, and liberal families based on 
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research conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (see 
Smith 1986, 1990). Model 3 of Table 3 introduces dummy variables to 
separate and control for fundamentalist, moderate and liberal 
traditions. In addition, we follow Coreno (2002) and Welch et al., who 
argue for a separate classification for Black Protestant denominations 
because of the unique historical experience of black denominations, 
coding all African Americans who claim a preference for a Protestant 
denomination in a separate variable. Note that this variable is slightly 
different from an interaction term between African American and 
Protestant, as African American Protestants are removed from the 
other Protestant categories to differentiate between black Protestant 
and white Protestant. 
The results of Model 3 indicate that black Protestants and 
members of fundamentalist and Catholic traditions are less likely to 
trust others—relative to the base group of individuals who do not claim 
a preference for a particular denomination—while liberal Protestant 
traditions are more likely to trust others.5 Members of moderate 
Protestant traditions are not statistically significantly different from the 
base group. In addition, the chi-square statistic on the joint 
significance of the denomination variables rises to 150.23 and both the 
null hypothesis of all the coefficients on the denominations being 
simultaneously zero.  
Welch et al.(2004) contend, and this is arguably the most 
important contribution of their work, that Pentecostal conservative 
Protestant traditions are distinct from other Protestant groupings as 
they establish the strongest social barriers and are therefore more 
likely to have a strong negative effect on social trust. If Pentecostal 
members are included in the fundamentalist group, as in Model 3, it 
may well be the source of the negative and significant effect. In Model 
4, Pentecostals are separated from the other Protestant traditions. To 
do so, we use the denomination profiles of The Association of Religion 
Data Archives (http://www.thearda.com) at Pennsylvania State 
University to further sort the GSS data into Pentecostal families. 
Appendix 1 provides the denominations that are included in the 
Pentecostal variable. 
The results of Model 4 show that the Pentecostal variable is 
indeed negative and statistically significant. Further, the inclusion of 
the additional classification had little impact on the sign and 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Review of Social Economy, Vol 68, No. 2 (June 2010): pg. 163-186. DOI. This article is © Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Routledge: Taylor & Francis 
Group does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group. 
15 
 
significance of the other denominations—except for a slight 
improvement in the p-value for Catholics—and little impact on the chi-
square statistic of joint significance. As reported earlier, Welch et al. 
(2004) assert that Pentecostals are distinct from other Protestants 
because of an additional “individualizing” effect. Model 4, indeed, 
indicates a larger marginal effect for Pentecostals (in absolute value) 
than other denominations. Further hypotheses tests show no statistical 
difference between black Protestants and Pentecostals. The differences 
between Pentecostals and fundamentalists and Pentecostals and 
Catholics, however, are statistically significant (p-values of 7.0 percent 
and 3.8 respectively) as is the difference between fundamentalist and 
Catholic (p-value of 4.2 percent). 
We simulate the change in the probability that an individual 
chooses that “most people can be trusted” under various scenarios 
using Clarify (Tomz et al. 2001; King et al. 2000) to better 
communicate the contribution of the different denominations to trust. 
The process followed was to estimate Model 4 of Table 3 and draw 
1,000 sets of simulated parameters of the model. Values are then 
chosen for the explanatory variables to represent a baseline individual. 
Based on means and most frequent occurrences (see Tables 1 and 2), 
the baseline individual is the mean value for age, number of children, 
income, happiness, and attendance. The individual is also married, 
female, and white, works full time, has between 12 and 16 years of 
education, and lives in Census division 5. The midpoint of the sample 
period, 1988, was selected as the year and initially the individual has 
no preference for a particular religious denomination. Next, the 
probability that the baseline individual believes “most people can be 
trusted” is simulated. 
To show the impact of various denominations on trust, the 
denomination of the baseline individual is changed to a specific 
denomination and the probability that the individual believes “most 
people can be trusted” is simulated again. (One important note is that, 
for black Protestant, the individual is still coded as white. Otherwise, 
the simulation would reflect both being African American and 
belonging to a black protestant denomination.) Figure 1 illustrates the 
difference in the probability that the individual of a particular 
denomination believes “most people can be trusted” from the 
probability of the baseline individual. As seen in Figure 1, being a 
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member of a liberal Protestant denomination increases the probability 
that an individual trusts others while being a Catholic or member of 
fundamentalist, Pentecostal, or black Protestant denomination reduces 
the probability that an individual trusts others. (Recall that moderate 
Protestant was not statistically significantly different from those 
individuals who do not claim a preference for a particular 
denomination.) The figure also clearly shows the differential effect on 
trust of the denominations, with Pentecostal and black Protestant 
reducing by the most the probability that an individual trusts others. 
Figure 1 Contribution of Denominations to Trust 
 
 
Models 2, 3, and 4, therefore, confirm our initial hypotheses, that 
members of conservative (Pentecostal and fundamentalist) Protestant 
denominations trust others less, members of liberal Protestant 
denominations trust others more, and participation, in general, leads 
to greater trust of others.6  
Interaction Effects 
The importance of the interaction effects is to determine if 
greater immersion in a particular denomination and, therefore, greater 
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interaction with members of the denomination reinforces the 
denomination effect or moderates the denomination effect. Table 4 
provides the interaction of attendance with the various sub-
denomination categories of Model 4 in Table 3. Note that after 
attendance has been interacted with all sub-denomination groupings, 
the coefficient of attendance itself reflects the impact of attendance on 
those individuals who do not have a preference for any particular 
denomination. Recall that an individual might not claim a preference 
for any particular denomination yet may or may not attend religious 
services. The coefficient on attendance is statistically insignificant, 
indicating that increased attendance does not affect the group of 
individuals who do not claim an affiliation. 
Table 4: Interaction Effects 
 
Dependent variable is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” Robust standard errors 
are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed tests. Model includes 
year and census division controls whose results are available upon request. 
The interaction terms are also insignificant for black Protestants, 
Pentecostals, fundamentalists, Catholics, Jewish, and other religions. 
For these denominations, therefore, the impact of religion occurs 
through the denomination effect and the level of attendance does not 
appear to either reinforce or moderate the denomination effect. In 
contrast, the interaction terms are positive and significant for both 
moderate and liberal Protestant denominations. Recall from Table 3 
that moderate Protestant was not statistically significantly different 
from individuals with no denominational preference. Hence, the impact 
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on moderate Protestants is through attendance only. The interaction 
for liberal Protestants indicates that greater attendance reinforces the 
positive impact of affiliation on trust, and for this group, there exists 
both a denomination and attendance effect. 
Time Dimensions 
The GSS data allow us to consider potential changes in trust in 
general, and changes in the contribution of affiliation and attendance 
over time. To begin, we follow Guiso et al. (2003), and test for a 
Vatican II effect on Catholics by creating a dummy variable for those 
individuals born after 1962. This variable is then interacted with the 
Catholic variable and both variables are included in Model 4. The 
interaction term is statistically insignificant providing no evidence of a 
Vatican II effect an Catholics' trust of others. 
Putnam (2000) claims there is evidence of a downward trend in 
social trust since the 1960s. Costa and Kahn (2003), however, find the 
evidence of a trend in social capital mixed. To investigate a trend in 
our variable on social trust, we drop the controls for individual years 
and include a time trend and its square instead. We do not include 
these results in Table 3, and simply report that the trend was negative 
and significant at the 1 percent level, but the non-linear term was not 
significant. Furthermore, though there was no impact on the sign or 
significance of any of the model variables, there was a slight drop in 
the pseudo R2. 
The time trend was next interacted with each of the 
denomination groups in Model 4. The only interaction term that was 
significant was Jewish, which was positive and significant with a p-
value of 7 percent. The time trend alone, which in this model captures 
the impact of time on individuals who did not have a preference for a 
given denomination, remained negative and statistically significant. 
Hence, the contribution of the various denominational groupings in 
Model 4, other than Jewish, to trust appears to be robust over time in 
a statistical sense. 
Finally, the time trend was interacted with attendance to 
examine if the impact of attendance, in general, has changed over 
time. Because of the nature of this variable, two dummy variables 
were created, one for relatively high attendance and one for relatively 
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low attendance, leaving as the base group those individuals who never 
attend religious services. The high-attendance dummy included 
individuals that attend religious services at least once a week or more 
and the low-attendance dummy included individuals that attended at 
least once a year but less than once a week or more. The high-
attendance and low-attendance variables were positive and significant, 
but their interactions with the time variable were not. Hence, the 
impact of attendance appears to be robust over time as well.7 (All of 
the results regarding the time trend and its interaction are available 
upon request.)  
This leaves us to consider further Putnam's (2000) claim that 
trends in religious practices and participation tend to reinforce the 
decline in social trust rather than counterbalance that trend. He makes 
his point explicit (p. 78) that it is the arguable decline in overall 
participation and the shifting of membership out of more moderate 
and liberal denominations toward more conservative evangelical 
denominations that renders religion in the United States as “less 
effective now as a foundation for civic engagement and bridging social 
capital.” Although the results given here do not prove this claim, they 
do imply that the contribution of overall religious participation and the 
different effects of individual denominations to social trust are stable 
over time. We suggest that if religion is indeed less effective in 
generating social trust, it might be due to declining participation and a 
shift from liberal protestant denominations to fundamentalist and 
Pentecostal denominations and merits further investigation. 
Conclusion 
Recently there has been a renewed interest in the relationship 
between religion, social trust, and economic outcomes. This interest is 
likely motivated by two factors; the persistent and high rate of 
religious participation in the United States relative to most other 
advanced economies and, that religious participation arguably remains 
the most important form of voluntary participation in the United 
States. Although recent literature has provided compelling theoretical 
arguments for a relationship between social trust and religion, recent 
empirical yield mixed evidence. In particular, cross-country studies 
such as Guiso et al. (2003) and Barro and McCleary (2003) find an 
association between religious participation and trust, while studies on 
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the United States such as Welch et al. (2004) and Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002) find mixed or no evidence to support an association. 
In this paper we use GSS data spanning 25 years to test the 
relationship between trust and religious participation and affiliation. 
We hypothesize that greater frequency of participation in a religious 
network leads to an increased trust of others, while affiliation, in 
contrast, may have differential effects. Empirical results show that 
Pentecostals, fundamentalists, black Protestants, and Catholics are 
less likely to trust others, while members of liberal denominations are 
more likely to trust others. Hence, the trust attitudes of members of 
conservative and black Protestant denominations stand in stark 
contrast to those of moderate and liberal denominations. In addition, 
while controlling for the denomination effect, trust is increasing with 
the frequency that the individual attends religious services. Interaction 
of attendance and denomination, however, indicates frequency of 
attendance is not significant for black Protestants, Pentecostals, 
fundamentalists, Catholics, Jewish, and other religions. The interaction 
term is significant and positive for Moderate and Liberal Protestants. 
In general, we find that religion does indeed play an important 
role in the formation of social trust. In addition, there are statistically 
significant differences among denominations and significant 
attendance effects. In addition, as suggested by Putnam (2000) and 
others, social trust in general has changed over time. Consequently, 
studies which aggregate sub- denominations to the major-
denomination level and that omit attendance mask important affiliation 
effects of religion and overlook participation effects and studies that 
focus only on a single year of data may not truly reflect the 
contribution of religion to social trust. Recently there has been 
evidence of increase switching by individuals in the United States 
among various denominations. Survey measures of this phenomenon 
and its impact on general trust of others, currently not available in the 
GSS, would be an important new direction for future research. 
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Appendix 1: Denominations in the GSS Reclassified as 
Pentecostal1  
 
1See The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) at 
http://www.thearda.com/Denoms/Families/F_94.asp 
Notes 
1Although Welch et al. do not provide the size of their various groupings of 
Protestant denominations, we are able to estimate their size using the 
appendix to the paper. It appears that some of the groups, fundamentalist 
Protestants for example, approach 30 individuals in number. Other groupings, 
of course, are much larger and provide reliable estimates for the year of their 
study. 
2It was not possible to accurately code other ethnic groups, such as Hispanics, 
in this data set. 
3Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) include the response to a question as to 
whether the individual has experienced a trauma in the past year. This 
question, however, was not asked over several years of the GSS survey, 
resulting in a greatly reduced sample size. 
4Smidt (1999) claims that the relationship between social trust and 
attendance is curvilineary, as those who attend the least and those who 
attend the most as being less trusting. We included in our regressions: (1) 
the square of attendance, and (2) dummied in each category of positive 
attendance, yet found no evidence of a non-linear relationship. 
5As an alternative to the coding of “black Protestant” described above, we 
also coded black Protestant as the three historically black denominations of 
National Baptist Convention in the USA, African Methodist Episcopal, and 
African Methodist Episcopal Zion. The only change in our results was that 
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“black Protestant” was negative and statistically insignificant. This new 
grouping, however, had significantly fewer observations (266 versus 3,410 in 
the original variable). 
6We also experimented with two additional dependent variables, “Do you 
think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or 
would they try to be fair?” and “Would you say that most of the time people 
try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” 
and a single variable that combined the three different questions on trust, 
fairness, and helpfulness together. The variable on fairness and the combined 
variable generated similar results as those presented here while the variable 
on helpfulness tended to show the religious participation variable as less 
statistically significant. 
7An important difference between the work here and that of Welch et al. 
(2004) is that Welch et al., use a single year, 2000, of National Election 
Survey data. One could hypothesize that an election cycle might well have an 
impact on individual trust. Hetherington (2005) shows that there has been a 
general decline in the public's trust of government, while Geer (2006) 
presents evidence that negative campaigning during an election cycle has a 
slight positive effect, if any at all, on trust of the government. We do not 
know of any systematic study of the impact of an election cycle on trust of 
other individuals. In Model 4 we dropped the year dummy and added a time 
trend and a dummy for presidential election years. The trend is negative and 
significant while the election dummy is positive and significant. This issue 
may be worthy of additional research. 
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